



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

<b>CASE TITLE:</b> (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) U.S. Foreign and Commercial Service International Trade Administration 1401 Constitution Ave Washington, DC 20230	<b>FILE NUMBER:</b>  FOP-WF-12-1077-I
	<b>TYPE OF REPORT</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Interim <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Final

**BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION**

On July 24, 2012 we received a request from the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), United States Department of State, to assist in an investigation of (b) (7)(C) concerning allegations of abuse and neglect of (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) is a Department of Commerce employee who works as a (b) (7)(C) for International Trade Administration (ITA) at the U.S. (b) (7)(C) in (b) (7)(C). (Attachment 1)

**RESULTS/SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION**

Our initial role in this case was to support the investigation of suspected abuse initiated by DSS, which found insufficient evidence to prove (b) (7)(C) sexually abused (b) (7)(C) children. However, the DSS investigation established a finding of child neglect on (b) (7)(C) part, and found (b) (7)(C) made several false statements to their investigators. Further investigation by our office revealed (b) (7)(C) utilized (b) (7)(C) government email account and internet to engage in sexually oriented discussions with various women on (b) (7)(C) government email account. (b) (7)(C) also received two emails from female acquaintances containing two pictures of nude females. (b) (7)(C) forwarded the above emails to (b) (7)(C) personal email account, as well as sending and receiving numerous emails on (b) (7)(C) government e-mail unrelated to (b) (7)(C) official duties with ITA. No child pornographic material was found on any of (b) (7)(C)'s DOC-owned computer equipment.

Distribution:    OIG <u>  x  </u> Bureau/Organization/Agency Management <u>  x  </u> DOJ: <u>      </u> Other (specify):			
Signature of Case Agent: (b) (7)(C)	Date: 9/13/13	Signature of Approving Official: <i>George Rivera Jr.</i>	Date: 9/12/2013
Name/Title: (b) (7)(C), Special Agent		Name/Title: George Rivera Jr., Special Agent in Charge	

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**METHODOLOGY**

This case was conducted through witness and subject interviews, as well as the acquisition of computer evidence, computer forensic analysis, and review of electronic data.

**DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION**

On August 1, 2012, this office determined DSS was investigating (b) (7)(C), ITA (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C), based in (b) (7)(C), who was alleged to have neglected (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (7)(C) and may have sexually abused them. (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C), and (b) (7)(C) of one of (b) (7)(C) minor (b) (7)(C) believed (b) (7)(C) was sexually abusing the minor child. (b) (7)(C) suspected the abuse based on statements made by minor child (b) (7)(C). At the time, (b) (7)(C) shared custody of minor child (b) (7)(C) with (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C), but maintains primary physical custody of minor child (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) lived with minor child (b) (7)(C) in U.S. Government housing located at the United States (b) (7)(C) in (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) also claimed that based on some statements from (b) (7)(C) minor child (also the offspring of (b) (7)(C) and identified as minor child (b) (7)(C)), (b) (7)(C) believes (b) (7)(C) sexually assaulted (b) (7)(C) in the past. (b) (7)(C) has full custody of this (b) (7)(C) minor child. (Attachment 2)

Information provided to us by DSS shows that on August 4, 2012, DSS accompanied (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and minor child (b) (7)(C) to the Armed Forces Center for Child Protection (CCP) at the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, to undergo a forensic psychological interview and assessment. The (b) (7)(C) did not disclose any sexual abuse or touching; however, (b) (7)(C) did disclose that (b) (7)(C) and minor child (b) (7)(C) all took a bath together when (b) (7)(C) was visiting (b) (7)(C) in (b) (7)(C) during the summer of 2011. CCP noted that other factors, including the age of minor child (b) (7)(C) at the time of bathing incident, and that (b) (7)(C) could have impacted disclosure. (Attachment 3)

On August 7, 2012, CCP conducted a forensic interview of minor child (b) (7)(C) who did not disclose any sexual abuse. The child stated (b) (7)(C) often walked around naked and (b) (7)(C) often slept nude as well. Minor child (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) would sometimes fall asleep in (b) (7)(C) bed after tucking (b) (7)(C) in, while (b) (7)(C) was naked. Minor child (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) sometimes slept in (b) (7)(C) bed as well. Minor child (b) (7)(C) also confirmed (b) (7)(C) and minor child (b) (7)(C) took a bath together with (b) (7)(C) in the summer of 2011. Minor child (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) would not take baths with (b) (7)(C) anymore. Minor child (b) (7)(C) also stated (b) (7)(C) had seen (b) (7)(C) penis "with skin and without." When asked by the forensic interviewer whether minor child (b) (7)(C) touched (b) (7)(C) penis, (b) (7)(C) said that it may or may not have happened, and that (b) (7)(C) couldn't remember. Regarding the original allegations of neglect, minor child (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) often was left home alone; that sometimes (b) (7)(C) would give (b) (7)(C) only an apple to eat at school for lunch when (b) (7)(C) forgot to prepare something; and that (b) (7)(C) would often take (b) (7)(C) out of school on

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Fridays to travel around (b) (7)(C). When asked, (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) wanted to live with (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C). (Attachment 3)

On August 8 2012, the (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C), and (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) conducted a conference call to discuss the investigative results. The (b) (7)(C) decided that given the substantiated allegations of neglect, and the possibility of future child endangerment, that minor child (b) (7)(C) should not return to the (b) (7)(C) as scheduled on August 11, 2012. Additionally, (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) also recommended that (b) (7)(C) be medically evacuated for evaluation in the United States. If (b) (7)(C) refused medical evacuation, then (b) (7)(C) would recommend an involuntary reassignment. (Attachment 3)

Based in part on the findings gleaned from the interviews with the minor children, DSS acquired an international search warrant for (b) (7)(C)'s consulate residence and related property in (b) (7)(C). On September 18, 2012, the search warrant was executed by DSS agents, and numerous computers, digital cameras, and removable digital media were seized. All evidence was transported from (b) (7)(C) to the United States in a diplomatic pouch. All computers and removable digital media were turned over to DSS computer investigations and forensics branch (CIF). DOC OIG assisted CIF with decryption of DOC computers with digital encryption. (Attachment 4)

On September 26, 2012, we learned (b) (7)(C) was permanently reassigned to Washington DC. This reassignment came as a result of request from Ambassador (b) (7)(C), Chief of the U.S. Mission in (b) (7)(C) to (b) (7)(C), ITA (b) (7)(C). The State Department reassignment request was made based on the results of the DSS investigation. Ambassador (b) (7)(C) believed (b) (7)(C)'s conduct would embarrass the United States government if it became known by the host government and that could possibly subject (b) (7)(C) to criminal prosecution in (b) (7)(C) or possible intervention by (b) (7)(C) child protective services. Based on this request, ITA curtailed (b) (7)(C)'s assignment in (b) (7)(C) and returned (b) (7)(C) to Washington, DC. (Attachment 5 & 6)

On January 29, 2013, we received the Report of Investigation (ROI) from DSS. DSS findings show that, according to the Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Standards for Appointment and Continued Employment (3 FAM 4130, 4139.14, and 1814), and based on a preponderance of evidence, the allegation of child neglect by (b) (7)(C) was substantiated. Specifically, the DSS ROI stated (b) (7)(C) neglected minor child (b) (7)(C) by leaving (b) (7)(C) in consulate assigned housing, not providing (b) (7)(C) with adequate meals to take to school, excessively removing minor child (b) (7)(C) from school so (b) (7)(C) could socialize with women (b) (7)(C) met via the internet, and for repeatedly failing to pick (b) (7)(C) child from the homes of other consulate employee's. The DSS ROI also stated the allegation of sexual child abuse as outlined in 18 U.S.C. 2242, could not be proven. (Attachment 6)

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The DSS ROI indicated (b) (7)(C) violated 18 U.S.C. 1001 by willfully making false statements to federal officers by lying about (b) (7)(C) travel since living in (b) (7)(C); however, DSS claimed its false statement finding did not meet the threshold to prosecute and therefore did not refer the case for prosecution. (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) only traveled twice with minor child (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) never missed school during these trips. Records revealed (b) (7)(C) took three official trips and seven personal trips, three of which were with minor child (b) (7)(C) traveled a total of 33 days in 2012. According to the DSS ROI, (b) (7)(C) also lied to investigators when (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) had not bathed with minor child (b) (7)(C) since living in (b) (7)(C). The DSS report also referenced interviews of the children that revealed (b) (7)(C) bathed with (b) (7)(C) children on several occasions, encouraged nudity in (b) (7)(C) home and took nude photos of minor child (b) (7)(C) while (b) (7)(C) was in the bathtub and while (b) (7)(C) was sleeping. (Attachment 6)

The DSS ROI also states (b) (7)(C) lied to investigators about (b) (7)(C) relationship with (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) admitted to knowing (b) (7)(C), and stated (b) (7)(C) was a character witness for (b) (7)(C) during the custody hearing of one of the children. However, according to the DSS ROI, (b) (7)(C) lied to DSS agents about how (b) (7)(C) knew (b) (7)(C) and stated (b) (7)(C) worked for (b) (7)(C) as a (b) (7)(C) while (b) (7)(C) lived in (b) (7)(C), when in fact, DSS found (b) (7)(C) met (b) (7)(C) at an "S&M" club in (b) (7)(C) and hired (b) (7)(C) to be (b) (7)(C) dominatrix. (b) (7)(C) also told DSS agents (b) (7)(C) had never misused (b) (7)(C) government email or used (b) (7)(C) position with the government to coerce women. DSS found (b) (7)(C) had several emails on (b) (7)(C) work account that prove (b) (7)(C) was harassing women associated with the US (b) (7)(C) in (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C). The DSS investigation also found (b) (7)(C) received two sexually explicit photos from (b) (7)(C), a former (b) (7)(C), at (b) (7)(C) government email account. (b) (7)(C) forwarded both photos to (b) (7)(C) personal email account. (Attachment 6)

On January 29, 2013, we received DOC-owned computer equipment from DSS which was seized during service of the search warrant on (b) (7)(C) residence in (b) (7)(C). Analysis of the email files by both DOC OIG and DSS, revealed (b) (7)(C) utilized (b) (7)(C) government email account to meet women via the internet, as well as engage in discussions with females about sex utilizing (b) (7)(C) government email account. (b) (7)(C) also received and forwarded, to (b) (7)(C) personal email account, two pictures featuring a nude female using (b) (7)(C) government email account. Furthermore, (b) (7)(C) sent and received 1320 personal emails on (b) (7)(C) government email that had no bearing on (b) (7)(C) official duties with ITA. No child pornographic material was found on any of (b) (7)(C) DOC-owned computer equipment. (Attachment 7 & 8)

On May 31, 2013 we contacted the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), Child Victim Identification Program (CVIP), in order to coordinate submitting a copy of a forensic analysis of (b) (7)(C)'s personal computers and other external media storage devices seized during the search warrant. We made these images available for NCMEC to compare unidentified child pornographic images to ensure there were no images depicting (b) (7)(C) minor children in child pornographic image series maintained by NCMEC. NCMEC confirmed the images of (b) (7)(C)'s minor children were not known to be circulating as child pornography. (Attachments 9, 10 & 11)

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On June 20, 2013, we interviewed (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C), ITA. Also present during the interview was (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C), to act as (b) (7)(C)'s legal representative. (b) (7)(C) claims (b) (7)(C) received only minimal training in the use of DOC IT assets such as Blackberry devices and (b) (7)(C) government email account. When we asked (b) (7)(C) whether (b) (7)(C) completed the annual Department of Commerce IT Security Awareness Training (b) (7)(C) admitted that (b) (7)(C) is "supposed to do it every year." (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) had a general understanding of DOC policies related to the use of (b) (7)(C) government email account, and stated "You know you use it for business. You're allowed to have some personal use." (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) understood that (b) (7)(C) government email account was supposed to be used for government related work, and limited personal use, and that (b) (7)(C) "tries" not to misuse (b) (7)(C) government email account. We asked (b) (7)(C) if (b) (7)(C) had ever used (b) (7)(C) government email account to communicate any sexual acts with women. (b) (7)(C) stated, "No, not that I know of." (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) may have used (b) (7)(C) government issued Blackberry device to discuss personal relationships. (b) (7)(C) stated a woman (b) (7)(C) didn't know, who (b) (7)(C) referred to as the "(b) (7)(C)", may have been the one who sent (b) (7)(C) nude pictures of herself. (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) forwarded the emails to (b) (7)(C) personal email account containing the two nude images because (b) (7)(C) "wanted to keep a record of this stuff" in the event it was some sort of bribery or extortion scheme. (b) (7)(C) said that (b) (7)(C) responses to the unknown female sending (b) (7)(C) nude images were "flippant" and that they were of "no real consequence". When shown inappropriate emails discussing sexual activity with women, (b) (7)(C) stated, "It's just kind of chitchat. Um, like I said, I'm not, I'm never going to do that again." (Attachment 12)

(b) (7)(C) stated a woman (b) (7)(C) dated while working in (b) (7)(C) named (b) (7)(C) would send (b) (7)(C) long emails and that (b) (7)(C) told (b) (7)(C) many times to use (b) (7)(C) private email address and not send emails to (b) (7)(C) government email address. (b) (7)(C) stated again that (b) (7)(C) responses to these emails were cursory and flippant. (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) knew (b) (7)(C), and was trying to cause problems for (b) (7)(C) when (b) (7)(C) was based in (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) understood using (b) (7)(C) government email account for personal use, and to communicate sexually oriented emails related to personal relationships, was inappropriate. (b) (7)(C) went on to say, "I apologize if I've sent anything wrong. I mean, that's not ever going to happen again." (Attachment 12)

On or about August 7, 2013, this office learned (b) (7)(C), U.S. ambassador to (b) (7)(C) was allegedly involved in illegal activity. Computer forensic analysis of (b) (7)(C)'s government email files indicated (b) (7)(C) worked for (b) (7)(C) when both (b) (7)(C) were working in (b) (7)(C). Based on this association, we conducted additional forensic analysis on (b) (7)(C)'s email files in order to determine if there was any inappropriate communication between (b) (7)(C) and Ambassador (b) (7)(C). We reviewed 756 emails sent and received between August 2010 and August 2011, and found the content of the emails to be work related. (Attachment 13)

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**TABLE OF ATTACHMENTS**

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